Like the ex-wife in Bucket, our client also finds herself being unemployed and of limited financial assets. Also like the wife in Bucket, our client was married to her husband for a period of time, cohabitate for a period f time and re-married. However, unlike Buyback, our client only cohabited with her husband for 8 years, as compared to almost 3 decades. Criterion that are unknown in our client’s situation are her current age and her specific health condition, as well as her employability. Although these factors are not substantial, they are also considered by the courts in determining the amount and duration of spousal support.
The significant of Bucket is that our client will most likely not be able to rely on her “long term” relationship with Sam Smith in which the cohabitation period will count. Since this is a family law issue, support for cohabitation years will likely have to be pursued through other avenues such as civil court through a Marvin type action. II. Prior Marriage Distinguishing itself from Bucket, Chapman stands for the proposition that a court may consider, inter alai, a previous marriage between the same parties when awarding spousal support.
In Chapman, the parties were initially married for 19 years. The wife had obtained an interlocutory Judgment of dissolution and three years later a Total Judgment AT Ululations was entered analog ten marriage. During his time frame, the parties continued their relationship on and off until they remarried approximately 1 year after the final dissolution. Within less than 4 months of re-marriage, the parties again decided to divorce. At the time of trial, the wife had numerous health conditions requiring multiple previous and potential future visits to the hospital for extended periods of time.
Her income was insufficient to meet her monthly obligations, and her employment was sporadic and bleak, as the husband had asked her several times to quit her Jobs. On the other hand, the husband was employed and lived with his girlfriend that was lethal and took care of his expenses. In reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision, the reviewing court in Chapman again looked to the factors listed in Civil Code S 4801, noting particularly the “Just and equitable” catch all factor.
Chapman held that the principles of relieving liability of a former spouse from paying spousal support when the other spouse remarries to a third party would ill-conceived and misused when that remarriage is to the original spouse. The court also held that policy considerations, along with viewing the brevity of the non-marital status in twine the marriages, warranted a finding that would allow a trial court Judge from also considering that “the resumption of that [marital] relationship as restoring rather than termination their longstanding obligations to one another. Thus, a court may now consider “the length of, and orders flowing out of, a previous marriage between the same parties. ” The court opined that a contrary finding would effectively incentive reconciliation and quick dissolution and in attempting to eliminate spousal support liability, thus “defeat[inning] the strong policy of this state hat a spouse in need of support at the end of a long marriage be supported by the other for as long as necessary. ” Like the plaintiff in Chapman, our client was initially married to her current husband, divorced for a period of time, followed by a re-marriage.
However, in Chapman, the first marriage was 19 years, divorced for 3 years, with the longest physical separation of 6 months, and an even shorter second marriage of three and one-half months. Our client on the other hand was married for 10 years, divorced for 8 years, with minimal physical separation, and remarried or an additional 4 years to her current husband. However, our client does not have a brief separation between the marriages and was in non-marital status for almost as long as the first marriage.
Whereas in Chapman, the parties were only divorced for 3 years, which the reviewing court used to consider the reverse and remanding of the trail courts decision. Like the plaintiff in Chapman, our client is in poor health and has no income as she is unable to work. Unlike Chapman, what is currently unknown is our client’s age, the severity of her health condition, as well as her employability which will be used to factor the amount of the spousal award, if any.
Based on the policy considerations taken into account in Chapman given the brevity of the parties’ non-marital relationship, our client’s first marriage may not have a Just and equitable bearing on the parties’ present obligation as the interim period between the first and second marriage was almost as long as the initial marriage. This appeared to be a determining factor for the court in Chapman. The court may take into consideration the fact that they reconciled and remarried, but would be less inclined to recognize that the resumption of the relationship as estrogen ratter tan terminating tenet longstanding Dilatation to one another.
Therefore, although the court in our client’s situation may look to her first marriage with her husband, it may find that the long gap in-between the marriage does not warrant consideration for purposes of spousal support. Conclusion For the aforementioned reasons, it is probable that the court will not take into consideration our client’s cohabitation period with her current husband. However, the court may take into consideration our client’s first marriage with her current husband when determining the amount and duration of spousal support.